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  1  While transposition is required to make EU directives applicable at the national level by way 
of adoption of national measures, implementation is concerned with non-conformity and incor-
rect application cases. For an overview of the difference between transposition and implementation, 
see  www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/608841/IPOL_BRI(2018)608841_EN.pdf . 
In certain instances, the implementation of EU soft law is required, see, eg, EIOPA guidelines on the 
implementation of the Solvency II Directive. 
  2  M  Hartlapp ,  ‘ Soft Law Implementation in the EU Multilevel System: Legitimacy and Govern-
ance Effi ciency Revisited ’ in  N  Behnke ,  J  Broschek and  J  Sonnicksen (eds),  Confi gurations, Dynamics 
and Mechanisms of  Multilevel Governance ( New York ,  Springer International Publishing ,  2019 ) . 
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 ‘ Verba Volant, Quoque 
(Soft Law) Scripta ? ’ 
 An Analysis of the Legal Effects of 
National Soft Law Implementing EU 
Soft Law in France and the UK 
 GIULIA  GENTILE 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 EU SOFT LAW is not subject to transposition duties by the Member States. 1 Yet national authorities have increasingly adopted soft law acts to imple-ment EU soft law in a variety of policy areas, such as competition and 
environment. As argued by Hartlapp, national implementation practices result 
in efficiency gains, while the implementation of EU soft law by the Member 
States demonstrates that EU soft law has legal effects. 2 
 This chapter provides insights into the effects of selected soft law measures 
issued by the French and UK authorities to implement EU Commission soft law 
in competition and environmental policies. The contribution of this chapter to 
the existing literature and the European Network of Soft Law Research (SoLaR) 
project is twofold. First, the chapter conducts a textual analysis of the chosen 
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  3  The full version of the Latin proverb is  ‘ Verba volant, scripta manent ’ ( ‘ Spoken words fl y away, 
written words remain ’ ). 
  4  See, among others,  O  Ş tefan ,  ‘ European Competition Soft Law in European Courts: A Matter 
of Hard Principles ? ’ ( 2008 )  14  European Law Journal  753 ;  E  Korkea-aho ,  ‘ EU Soft Law in Domestic 
Legal Systems: Flexibility and Diversity Guaranteed ? ’ ( 2009 )  16  Maastricht Journal of  European 
and Comparative Law  271 ;  T  Devine and  M  Eliantonio ,  ‘ EU Soft Law in the Hands of National 
Authorities: The Case Study of the UK Competition and Markets Authority ’ ( 2018 )  11  Review of  
European Administrative Law  49 . 
national implementing measures and closely assesses their wording. Second, 
it discusses the legal effects of national implementing soft law with regard to 
(a) the potential effect on third parties, (b) the infl uence on the discretion of the 
issuing authority and (c) the use made by national courts. This analysis reaches 
two main fi ndings. First, the legal effects of national implementing soft law are 
unsettled and thus increase unpredictability and uncertainty associated with EU 
soft law. Second, there is a risk of fragmentation of legal effects between EU soft 
law and national implementing soft law, decreasing legal certainty and hinder-
ing good governance. 
 Ancient wisdom offers guidance to rationalise the role and effects of EU and 
national soft law and suggests a way forward. According to the Latin proverb, 3 
spoken words ( verba )  ‘ fl y away ’ ( volant ) and thus have no infl uence on indi-
viduals ’ behaviour, while written words ( scripta ) will  ‘ remain ’ ( manent ) and 
infl uence legal conduct. How can we then ensure that the wording of EU soft 
law measures  ‘ stays ’ and does not  ‘ fl y away ’ ? This chapter argues that EU institu-
tions, jointly with national authorities and courts, should strive to enhance the 
uniformity of the effects of soft law measures at the EU level and in Member 
States. In particular, EU and national authorities ought to ensure that soft law 
is treated as  ‘ written words ’ ( scripta ), the meaning and effects of which  ‘ remain ’ 
( manent ) in the legal orders of the EU and its Member States. 
 The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. First, an overview is given of the 
selected EU policy areas and the legal effects of EU soft law measures issued in 
these fi elds are described. Second, the national implementation of specifi c EU soft 
law measures in the areas of competition and environment law in France and the 
UK are discussed, along with the legal consequences of national implementing 
soft law. Some fi nal remarks and suggestions on how to address the fragmentation 
of the legal effects of EU and national soft law are provided in the conclusion. 
 II. METHODOLOGY 
 This chapter analyses selected national soft law measures adopted in France and 
the UK to implement EU Commission soft law on competition (excluding State 
aid) and environmental matters. Both of these fi elds fall within the scope of the 
SoLaR project, have attracted attention in literature 4 and represent, respectively, 
exclusive and shared EU competences. Accordingly, they refl ect different levels of 
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  5  See A Hofmann,  ch 3 in this volume. 
  6  The UK left the EU on 31 January 2020. The analysis included in the chapter pre-dates Brexit day. 
  7  See N Rubio and O Ş tefan,  ch 8 in this volume. See also  C  Thibierge ,  ‘ Le droit souple, r é fl exion 
sur les textures du droit ’ ( 2003 )  4  Revue trimestrielle de droit civil  599 . 
  8  Judicial decisions constituting common law are classifi ed among the UK legal sources. Among 
the sources of UK law, scholars also include constitutional conventions, which are not strictly speak-
ing legal documents. See  B  Hilaire ,  Understanding Public Law ( Abingdon ,  Taylor  & Francis ,  2009 ) 9. 
See also M Dobbs and O Ş tefan,  ch 15 in this volume, as well as N Xanthoulis and A Karatzia, 
 ch 6 in this volume. 
  9  The chapter analyses a total of eight implementing measures, four in the area of competition 
law (two in France and two in the UK) and four in the area of environmental policy (two in France 
and two in the UK). 
centralisation of EU policies and distinct types of EU soft law. EU and national 
competition authorities (NCAs) rely on a robust organisation with extensive 
powers, directed and overseen by the Commission. In contrast, the EU and 
Member State environmental authorities cooperate within less structured and 
more informal networks. As a result, soft law in these areas also serves differ-
ent purposes. EU competition soft law is classifi ed as decisional-interpretative, 
whilst soft law issued in the domain of environmental law and policy primarily 
intends to guide the implementation of relevant policies and offer interpretative 
guidance to (national) decision-makers. 5 
 The legal orders of France and the UK 6 are taken as textbook examples of 
common and civil law systems. In the French system, the divide between hard 
law and soft law remains controversial in the academic literature and case law. 
Labelling acts that do not stem from the legislative process as  ‘ law ’ is prob-
lematic, as it runs against the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, according 
to which the Parliament issues laws that are the expression of the will of the 
people. 7 In a common law system, such as the UK, a more encompassing notion 
of law exists 8 and the question of the legal effects or bindingness of an act issued 
by national authorities has not occupied English courts or scholars. 
 Interestingly  – but understandably, given the lack of the duty to transpose  – 
national authorities in the selected jurisdictions have not implemented the same 
EU soft law acts. Therefore, since a top-down selection (ie, choosing the EU soft 
law measure and researching the implementing measures in France and the UK) 
was not possible, a bottom-up approach was followed instead (ie, researching 
among national acts and selecting measures 9 that have implemented EU soft law). 
 This chapter focuses on French and UK soft law implementing measures that 
include references to EU soft law or provide details concerning the relationship 
between the national implementation instrument and the original EU soft law 
measure. This selection method ensures that the sample comprises national acts 
that are specifi cally intended to give effects to EU soft law. Among the plethora 
of existing national soft law measures, the author has selected and analysed acts 
that best illustrate the diversity of soft law implementation practices in France 
and the UK. The sample is neither systematic nor exhaustive, but is intended to 
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  10  Article 3 TFEU. See also  C  Townley and  AH  T ü rk ,  ‘ The Constitutional Limits of EU Competi-
tion Law: United in Diversity ’ ( 2019 )  64  Antitrust Bulletin  235 . 
  11  See  DJ  Gerber ,  Law and Competition in Twentieth-Century Europe:  Protecting Prometheus 
( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2001 ) . 
  12  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [ 2003 ]  OJ L1/1 . 
  13  See  I  Maher ,  ‘ Competition Law Modernization: Evolutionary Tale ? ’ in  P  Craig and  G  de B ú rca (eds), 
 Evolution of  EU Law ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2011 ) . See also I Maher,  ch 2 in this volume. 
  14  Information gathered through EUR-Lex,  https://bit.ly/35cGSog . 
  15  See, eg,  ‘ Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities ‘ [ 2004 ]  OJ 
C101/43 ;  European Commission,  ‘ Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the 
Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty ’ [ 2004 ]  OJ C101/65 . 
  16  See, eg,  European Commission,  ‘ Commission Notice on Immunity from fi nes and reduction of 
fi nes in cartel cases ’ [ 2016 ]  OJ C298/17 . Its introduction specifi es that the notice is a  ‘ documenta-
tion tool and has no legal effects ’ . The effects of EU soft law in the fi eld of EU state aid have been 
discussed in  O  Ş tefan ,  Soft Law in Court:  Competition Law, State Aid and the Court of  Justice of  
the European Union ( Dordrecht ,  Kluwer Law International ,  2013 ) . 
  17  See, eg,  Case-19/77  Miller International Schallplatten GmbH v EC Commission [ 1978 ] 
 EU:C:1978:19 . Also, in  Case T-79/12  Cisco  & Messaget Spa v Commission [ 2013 ]  EU:T:2013:635 , 
the General Court (GC) relied on the guidelines of the Commission on horizontal mergers as an 
interpretative tool to apply Regulation 139/2004, jointly with the relevant case law. 
highlight certain important aspects for both jurisdictions. The lack of soft law 
in France and the UK giving effects to the  same EU soft law measure is a testa-
ment to the fragmented implementation of EU soft law in the Member States. 
 III. EU COMPETITION SOFT LAW 
 Competition law falls within the exclusive competences of the EU. 10 The expan-
sion of this particular EU competence was proactively driven by the Commission 
Directorate-General for Competition (DG Comp), which has a central role in 
investigating potential violations in this fi eld. 11 Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003 
has devolved competence in handling competition cases to the NCAs, 12 which, 
jointly with the Commission, exercise oversight powers and enforce EU and 
national competition law. Cooperation also occurs at a horizontal level amongst 
Member State competition authorities. The European Competition Network 
(ECN), composed of the Commission and NCAs, operates as a coordination 
mechanism for the enforcement of EU competition law. 
 Over the years, the Commission has issued numerous soft law acts in the 
fi eld of competition law 13 in the form of notices, recommendations, opinions 
or communications, 14 with the operation of the ECN itself regulated primar-
ily through soft law. 15 Despite a wealth of soft law in this area, there is still 
uncertainty surrounding the effects of EU competition soft law. For instance, 
soft law measures may contain caveats mentioning that they do not bind the 
Commission. 16 Yet, EU courts have not been deterred from relying on those 
acts in their reasoning 17 or from establishing that soft law instruments bind the 
discretion of their author, and that national courts should consider EU soft law 
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  18  Case C-322/88  Grimaldi [ 1989 ]  EU:C:1989:646 . See also  Case C-526/14  Kotnik [ 2016 ] 
 EU:C:2016:570 . See  E  Korkea-aho ,  ‘ National Courts and European Soft Law: Is  Grimaldi Still Good 
Law ? ’ ( 2018 )  37  Yearbook of  European Law  470 . 
  19  Z  Georgieva ,  ‘ Soft Law in EU Competition Law and its Judicial Reception in Member States: 
A Theoretical Perspective ’ ( 2014 ) TILEC Discussion Paper. 
  20  Translation from French; see  PM  Eisemann ,  ‘ Les Gentlemen ’ s agreements comme source du 
droit international ’ ( 1979 )  Journal du droit international  326 , cited in  F  Chatzistavrou ,  ‘ L ’ usage du 
soft law dans le syst è me juridique international et ses implications s é mantiques et pratiques sur la 
notion de r è gle de droit ’ ( 2005 )  15  Le Portique  79 . 
  21  Leniency programmes allow for reductions of sanctions linked to competition infringements 
under certain conditions, such as the cooperation of companies with the national or European 
authorities in the identifi cation of anti-competitive behaviour. 
  22  European Commission,  ‘ Communication de la Commission concernant la non-imposition 
d ’ amendes ou la r é duction de leur montant dans les affaires portant sur des ententes ’ [ 1996 ]  OJ 
C207/4 . 
  23  Case C-557/12  Pfl eiderer [ 2011 ]  EU:C:2011:389 , para 21. 
  24  L 464-2 and R 464-5 of the French Commercial Code, introduced with the loi du 15 mai 2001 sur 
les nouvelles r é gulations  é conomiques. 
  25  ‘ ECN Model Leniency Programme Report on Assessment of the State of Convergence ’ ,  https://
ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/model_leniency_programme.pdf ; see paras 4 and 5. 
when judging. 18 At the national level, Georgieva fi nds that EU competition soft 
law may gain effects as a vessel for general principles of EU law. 19 Despite these 
developments, the scope and nature of legal effects of EU competition soft law 
are not completely determined. 
 A. National Soft Law Measures Implementing EU Competition 
Soft Law in France 
 The Autorit é de la concurrence (AdC) is the competent authority to assess 
anti-competitive practices occurring on French territory and to issue relevant 
sanctions. As noted above, French scholars and judges have expressed sceptical 
views on soft law,  ‘ as it could be dangerous and affect the integrity of the legal 
order ’ . 20 These critical opinions have not prevented the AdC from implement-
ing EU soft law measures through national (soft law) acts. But the ambiguity 
concerning the legal effects of EU competition soft law is interestingly refl ected 
in the AdC ’ s implementing measures. To illustrate this point, the following para-
graphs discuss, in turn, the AdC ’ s measures implementing the ECN leniency 
programme model and the Commission guidelines on non-horizontal and hori-
zontal concentrations. 
 Leniency programmes 21 were fi rst created at the EU level through a 1996 
Commission communication. 22 These do not have  ‘ legislative force ’ and do not 
bind Member States. 23 In 2001, leniency programmes were introduced under the 
French Commerce Code. 24 The EU regulatory framework of leniency programmes 
changed with the creation of the ECN in 2003, and the adoption of the ECN 
model leniency programme, which is, like earlier leniency programmes, non-
binding and cannot create any legitimate expectations. 25 The absence of binding 
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  26  The communication was revised in 2012 and in 2015. 
  27  ‘ ECN Model Leniency Programme ’ (n 25) para 5. 
  28  www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/brochure_clemence_nov12.pdf . 
  29  Interestingly, in the  avis issued by the AdC concerning national leniency programmes, there is 
no mention of the European leniency programme model. 
  30  www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/sites/default/fi les/ld_concentrations_juill13.pdf . 
effects is meant to keep leniency procedures as fl exible as possible and to provide 
national authorities with discretion. Following the changes at the EU level, in 2006 
the AdC issued a  ‘ Communiqu é de proc é dure ’ laying down the substantive and 
procedural requirements to initiate a leniency programme under French law. 26 
The French communication gives guidance to market operators on how the AdC 
implements these programmes. The text of the communication remains silent as 
to its legal effects, but the relevant provisions of the Code of Commerce and the 
ECN model leniency programme are extensively mentioned. The communica-
tion also identifi es the AdC ’ s effort to  ‘ homogenise ’ the enforcement of leniency 
programmes in the light of the ECN model. 27 In 2012, the AdC issued a brochure, 
addressed to the general public, explaining the functioning of leniency procedure. 
The brochure mentions explicitly that it is devoid of level value. 28 
 By endorsing the ECN programme and implementing it via national soft 
law, the AdC has introduced a new tool of national governance modelled on 
the European example. The adoption of a soft law communication instead of 
legislation to lay down the procedural requirements of leniency programmes 
contributes to broadening the discretion of the AdC. The AdC ’ s soft law also 
increases fl exibility in setting leniency programmes. 
 Overall, the French implementation of the EU leniency programmes only 
partially resembles the initial EU measure. While both the Commission and 
the AdC primarily use soft law, the French legal order also regulates leniency 
programmes through hard law. Although there is presently no case law on the 
French leniency programmes, the presence of hard law in this fi eld resolves 
the issue of the breadth of the AdC ’ s discretion. The discretion of the AdC in 
enforcing leniency programme must respect the boundaries set by the Code de 
Commerce  – a piece of hard law. This also means that any violation of hard 
law provisions by the AdC is amenable to judicial control. The co-existence of 
hard and soft law in this fi eld nevertheless raises a concern: if national hard 
and soft law on leniency programmes are not applied harmoniously with the 
European leniency model, the efforts to  ‘ homogenise ’ European and national 
leniency programmes are held back. If national implementing measures are 
enforced independently from the ECN model, problems in terms of uniform 
application of EU law may arise. 29 Furthermore, the policy objectives envisaged 
and set out in the ECN model leniency programme may be frustrated if national 
implementing measures diverge from EU measures. 
 Another example is the Lignes directrices de l ’ Autorit é de la concurrence 
relatives au contr ô le des concentrations (hereinafter  ‘ AdC Lignes directices ’ ). 30 
As explained in their preface, these guidelines complement the existing national 
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  31  See, eg,  ‘ Communication consolid é e sur la compet é nce de la Commission en vertu du r è glement 
(CE) no 139/2004 du Conseil relatif au contr ô le des op é rations de concentration entre entreprises ’ 
[2009] OJ C43/10; European Commission,  ‘ Communication de la Commission relative aux restrictions 
directement li é es et n é cessaires  à la r é alisation des op é rations de concentration ’ [2005] OJ C56/24. 
  32  ‘ Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings ’ [ 2008 ]  OJ C265/6 . 
  33  ‘ Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings ’ [ 2004 ]  OJ C31/5 . 
  34  AdC Lignes directrices, paras 324 and 386 concerning the notion of horizontal merger and 
related issues. 
  35  These Commission guidelines have been applied by the General Court in  Cisco Systems Inc to 
assess whether the Commission respected the limits of its discretion. See  Cisco  & Messaget Spa v 
Commission (n 17). 
  36  This notion seems to indicate that the guidelines do not wish to create obligations of legislative 
nature  – thus, binding erga omnes. 
  37  D é cision n ° 10-DCC-198 du 30 d é cembre 2010 relative  à la cr é ation d ’ une entreprise commune 
par Veolia Environnement et la Caisse des D é p ô ts et Consignations. 
  38  AdC Lignes directrices, para 14. 
  39  Nathalie P é trignet et al,  ‘ Projet de r é vision des lignes directrices en mati è re de contr ô le des 
concentrations ’ , 25 March 2013,  https://cms.law/fr/fra/publication/fl ash-info-concurrence-projet-
de-revision-des-lignes-directrices-en-matiere-de-controle-des-concentrations . 
and EU legislation, and lay down the EU-inspired conditions to evaluate anticom-
petitive mergers. Through the guidelines, the AdC has also identifi ed additional 
situations that are not regulated under the original Commission communica-
tions. 31 The AdC Lignes directrices mention the Commission guidelines on 
non-horizontal 32 and horizontal 33 concentrations to interpret legal concepts 34 
and to set a minimum threshold for national policies. 35 A series of disclaim-
ers included in the AdC Lignes directrices provide insights on their intended 
legal nature. Paragraph 13 specifi es that this guidance is devoid of any  ‘ norma-
tive purpose ’ 36 and merely provides companies with  ‘ a pedagogical presentation 
on its scope, on the progress of the procedure before the Authority and the 
objectives, criteria and methods used for the analyses on the merits [of merger 
transactions] ’ . However, paragraph 14 indicates that the AdC Lignes directrices 
may be applied against individuals in the context of competition enforcement; 
indeed, they have been relied on by AdC when it has evaluated alleged anti-
competitive behaviour, jointly with hard law provisions. 37 
 It is unclear whether the AdC Lignes directrices can be invoked independently, 
without reference to hard law, against individuals before French courts. The 
issue of the effects of the AdC Lignes directrices becomes even more complex 
when we consider their impact on the discretion of the AdC. The AdC declares 
that it  ‘ undertakes to apply the guidelines each time it examines a transaction, 
provided that no circumstances particular to this transaction or any considera-
tion of general interest justify derogations therefrom ’ . 38 This statement raises 
more questions than answers. 
 Legal scholars and practitioners have argued that the wording of AdC Lignes 
directrices creates legal ambiguity as to their use by the AdC and national 
courts. 39 Moreover, due to many  ‘ vague ’ concepts in the AdC Lignes directrices, 
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  40  ibid. 
  41  Conseil d ’ É tat, 3 è me  – 8 è me chambres r é unies, 25/05/2018, 404382. 
  42  Case C-14/83  Von Colson [ 1984 ]  EU:C:1984:153 . See also  Grimaldi and  Kotnik (n 18). 
  43  See, eg, s 31D(1) of the Competition Act 1998, which requires the CMA to prepare and publish 
guidance on the circumstances in which it may be appropriate to accept binding commitments. 
market operators ultimately bear the risk of inconsistent interpretations. 40 The 
Conseil d ’ Etat case law has attempted to provide some degree of certainty and 
to remove risks for market operators, noting that the AdC Lignes directrices can 
be used to assess whether the authority has respected the limits of its discre-
tion. This case law makes no reference to the original EU soft law measure. 41 
Consequently, the fact that the national measures are of EU inspiration is 
immaterial in establishing its legal effects. In this respect, one may legitimately 
ask whether a divergent interpretation of the AdC Lignes directrices from the 
original EU soft law acts constitutes a breach of the EU principle of consistent 
interpretation. Being implementing measures of EU acts, it could be argued that 
the AdC Lignes directrices should be interpreted in the light of the original EU 
soft law measure under the  Von Colson doctrine. 42 
 B. National Soft Law Measures Implementing EU Competition 
Soft Law in the UK 
 UK competition law is populated by a plethora of hard and soft law acts. In 
addition to the provisions stemming from the EU Treaties, a primary legal 
source is the UK Competition Act 1998, establishing the competences of the 
Competition and Market Authority (CMA). Section 60 provides that national 
courts should ensure that there is no inconsistency between the EU and UK law 
when applying that Act. The basis for implementation practices of EU competi-
tion soft law in the UK is the Enterprises Act 2002. Section 106 provides that the 
CMA has powers to adopt soft law measures in the form of advice and guid-
ance documents. 43 The adoption of soft law is thus authorised by a national 
legislative provision. On the basis of this authorisation, the CMA has adopted 
multiple soft law measures. When implementing EU soft law, CMA acts refer to 
the original EU soft law and regulate their interplay with EU measures. Several 
CMA acts also replicate the content of EU soft law. 
 The study of the implementation of EU competition soft law in the 
UK will focus on two measures: the  ‘ Mergers: Guidance on the CMA ’ s 
jurisdiction and procedure ’ and the  ‘ Vertical Agreements: understanding 
competition law ’ guidance adopted by the Offi ce of Fair Trading (OFT). These 
acts, which are discussed below, implement the Commission Consolidated 
Jurisdictional Notice and the Commission ’ s  ‘ Guidelines on Vertical Restraints ’ , 
respectively. 
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  44  https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
fi le/384055/CMA2__Mergers__Guidance.pdf . 
  45  Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) [ 2004 ]  OJ L24/1 . 
  46  See n 44, para 1.5. 
  47  ibid para 1.6. 
  48  ibid para 1.5. 
  49  European Commission,  ‘ Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regu-
lation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings ’ [ 2008 ]  OJ C95/1 . 
  50  https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
fi le/284430/oft419.pdf . 
  51  https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/guidelines_vertical_en.pdf . 
  52  See n 50, para 4.6. The same also applies for other guidance; see, eg,  https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi le/284396/oft401.pdf . 
  53  ‘ Guidelines on Vertical Restraints ’ [ 2010 ]  OJ C130/1 . 
  54  See n 50, at 1. 
 The purpose of the  ‘ Mergers: Guidance on the CMA ’ s jurisdiction and 
procedure ’ 44 is to set rules on mergers involving companies active in the UK 
and covered by the provisions of the Enterprise Act. It briefl y addresses merg-
ers falling within the ambit of Commission competence under the EU Merger 
Regulation 45 and the relationship between domestic and European merger 
control systems. This national guidance cannot supersede any EU legislation or 
guidance, 46 and is to be applied fl exibly, with the Authority able to depart from 
it if need be. 47 Furthermore, the guidance cannot be considered as a compre-
hensive document,  ‘ nor can it be cited as a defi nitive interpretation of the law ’ . 48 
The content of the CMA guidance effectively reproduces the content of the 
Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) 
No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings. 49 
 In other national instruments, the connection with EU soft law has been 
acknowledged even more explicitly. An example is the  ‘ Vertical Agreements 
guidance adopted by the OFT, the authority preceding the CMA. 50 This guide-
line explains how the authority would apply Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the prohibition to vertical 
agreements, describing the application of the Commission ’ s Block Exemption 
for Vertical Agreements and the treatment of vertical agreements. In this guid-
ance document, the OFT has stated that it has taken into account the European 
Commission ’ s Notice  ‘ Guidelines on Vertical Restraints ’ 51 as a reference 
point. 52 As a result, the OFT Guidelines on Vertical Restraints should be read 
and applied together with the European Commission Notice on Guidelines on 
Vertical Restraints. 53 However, the CMA guidance also indicates that:  ‘ Anyone 
in doubt about how they may be affected by the EC Treaty, the Competition Act 
1998 or the Enterprise Act 2002 should seek legal advice. ’ 54 
 Thus, the CMA ’ s and OFT soft law measures are instruments addressed to 
companies in order to facilitate the interpretation of EU and national compe-
tition rules. The interaction between the EU and UK competition soft law is 
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  55  cf  ‘ Vertical Agreements ’ ,  https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/fi le/284430/oft419.pdf . 
  56  As required by the principle of supremacy, if a confl ict between national soft law and EU hard 
and soft law arises, the latter must prevail. How the CMA guidances will be applied after Brexit 
remains to be seen. 
  57  See, eg,  https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a71fe2be5274a7f9c5862d4/provisional_
fi ndings_report.pdf . 
  58  Soci é t é Coop é rative de Production SeaFrance SA v The Competition and Markets Authority et 
al [ 2015 ]  UKSC 75 . 
  59  The same circumstances could also arise for other NCAs when implementing EU soft law and 
applying relevant national measures. 
clearly governed by the principle of consistent interpretation, reaffi rmed at the 
national level under section 60 of the Competition Act and, more specifi cally, in 
the analysed national soft law acts. 55 Such principle ensures consistency between 
the EU and UK levels of governance. 56 
 In order to assess and identify the legal effects of the CMA ’ s soft law, atten-
tion should be paid to the competence of the CMA to adopt soft law measures 
under the Enterprise Act. Under this legislation, the authority is empowered to 
issue guidance concerning competition policies to the public. Therefore, such 
competence would be devoid of purpose if CMA soft law acts could not produce 
legal effects at least in the form of interpretative documents. As a consequence, 
CMA ’ s soft law measures should be presumed to produce legal effects in the light 
of the CMA ’ s competences. Another question is whether they can be invoked 
against individuals, as in France. First, it should be noted that the CMA relies on 
its guidance documents when issuing decisions against third parties. 57 Second, 
in case  Soci é t é Coop é rative de Production SeaFrance SA v The Competition 
and Markets Authority et al , 58 the UK Supreme Court (UKSC) interpreted the 
2014 CMA Merger guidelines discussed above. In the judgment, these guidelines 
were used to evaluate the effects of the cessation of business and determine the 
way in which the CMA assesses the relevant circumstances. The UKSC did not 
interpret the CMA guidelines in the light of the original EU soft law. However, 
the judgment confi rms that CMA soft law acts produce legal effects on third 
parties, both as legal basis for CMA ’ s decisions and as an interpretative docu-
ment. In addition, the CMA soft law has a  ‘ self-binding ’ effect on the authority ’ s 
discretion. 
 By way of a preliminary conclusion, the effects of UK competition soft law 
seem clearer and more coherent than those of French competition soft law. 
Indeed, the CMA has not excluded the  ‘ normative purpose ’ (ie, binding nature) 
of its soft law measures. Consequently, no contradiction has arisen between 
the wording of the CMA soft law and the way in which it has been applied by 
the CMA  – a contradiction that we have observed in relation to some of the 
analysed French competition soft law. 
 Yet the concerns raised for the AdC ’ s soft law also apply to the CMA meas-
ures. The CMA wields an extensive margin of discretion in the implementation 
and application of EU policies set in soft law acts. 59 If the national implementing 
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acts have binding effects not envisaged for the original EU measures, the former 
will  ‘ overachieve ’ the policy results set at the EU level. 60 As a result, the applica-
tion of the CMA soft law by the national authority without taking into account 
the legal effects of the original EU soft law will lead to the fragmentation of the 
effects between EU soft law and national implementing acts. The fragmentation 
of legal effects of EU soft law may also arise in the context of judicial inter-
pretation of CMA soft law. If CMA ’ s soft law is applied or interpreted by UK 
courts as having effects that are different from those of the EU original meas-
ures, the courts will also contribute to the fragmentation of the legal effects of 
soft law. 
 IV. EU ENVIRONMENTAL SOFT LAW 
 Both the EU and its Member States share legislative competences in environment. 
The EU environmental administrative structure is not centralised and relies on 
a number of EU and national entities, unlike the competition law model, where 
the Commission plays a  primus inter pares role. EU soft law is also different in 
the context of environmental law and policy. EU environmental measures often 
take the form of framework legislation. Soft law may be used to complement 
these frameworks and detail the content of EU environmental policies. Overall, 
environmental soft law has an interpretative function aimed at fostering the 
implementation of complex pieces of EU environmental legislation. 61 
 EU environmental soft law is abundant, amounting to more than 150 EU 
instruments in the form of recommendations, opinions and communications. 62 
The wealth of EU environmental soft law is partly due to the substantial 
Commission ’ s soft law-making powers stemming from EU hard law. For instance, 
Directive 2008/98 provides the Commission with the power to adopt guidance 
documents addressed to the Member States concerning the reduction of envi-
ronmental impact and waste. 63 As discussed by Eliantonio, EU environmental 
soft law has rarely been interpreted by the ECJ and is mostly cited by Advocates 
General (AGs), who use it as an interpretative tool. 64 The case law on environ-
mental guidance documents demonstrates that there is no uniform approach 
in relation to their effects. While the non-binding nature of these documents 
88 Giulia Gentile
  65  See, eg,  Case C-461/13  Bund f ü r Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland [ 2014 ]  EU:C:2014:2324 , 
Opinion of AG J ä ä skinen. 
  66  Eliantonio (n 61);  J  Scott ,  ‘ In Legal Limbo: Post-legislative Guidance as a Challenge for Euro-
pean Administrative Law ’ ( 2011 )  48  Common Market Law Review  329 . 
  67  www.ademe.fr/en/about-ademe . 
  68  D é cret n ° 2017-1071 du 24 mai 2017 relatif aux attributions du ministre d ’ Etat, ministre de la 
transition  é cologique et solidaire, JORF n ° 0123 du 25 mai 2017 texte n ° 10 sets out the competences 
of this minister. 
  69  G  Lisi et al,  ‘ National Report on France: The Use of EU Soft Law by National Courts and 
Administration in the Field of EU Environmental Law ’ in  M  Eliantonio and  G  Lisi (eds),  ‘ EU 
Environmental Soft Law in the Member States: A Comparative Overview of Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia and the UK ’ ( 2020 ) SoLaR Working Paper,  https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3656418 . 
  70  This is confi rmed by Lisi et al (ibid). 
  71  See  ADEME  ‘ M é thanisation ’ ( November 2016 ),  www.ademe.fr/sites/default/fi les/assets/
documents/avis_ademe_methanisation_novembre_2016.pdf . The document specifi es that the meth-
anisation should be one of the initiatives to achieve the objectives of the law on the green transition. 
  72  See, eg,  ADEME ,  Guide M é thodologique du D é veloppement des Strat é gies R é gionales 
d ’ É conomie Circulaire en France ( 2014 ) . This guide is mainly intended for elected offi cials and 
agents to mobilise support in view of the entry into force of the law on the green transition. 
  73  See, eg,  ‘ Lignes directrices encadrant l ’ adoption de d é cisions d ’ autorisation de mise  à disposi-
tion sur le march é de produits biocides ’ , implementing Regulation (EU) No 528/2012. 
is accepted in some cases, 65 the existence of legal effects does not seem to be 
explicitly excluded. 66 
 A. National Soft Law Measures Implementing EU Environmental 
Soft Law in France  
 The protection of the environment is at the core of numerous soft law acts issued 
by the Agence de l ’ Environnement et de la Ma î trise de l ’ É nergie (ADEME). This 
authority has a broad mandate to gather information, mobilise the public, advise 
in the adoption of policies and assist in their implementation. 67 The ADEME 
works under the supervision of the Ministry of Ecological and Solidarity 
Transition (METS). 68 Both the ADEME and the METS issue national guidance 
documents ( circulaires and  lignes directrices nationales ), which deal with simi-
lar themes to Commission guidance documents on environmental policy. 69 Some 
of the ADEME and METS guidelines expressly refer to these Commission docu-
ments. For instance, the French guidelines concerning the Environmental Impact 
Assessment Directive cite relevant EU soft law and include weblinks to EU guid-
ance documents. 70 Other soft law acts by the ADEME or the METS implement 
national hard law 71 or are preparatory documents for the adoption of local 
strategies 72 giving effects to EU policies. 73 Two examples of French environmen-
tal soft law will be discussed below: the ADEME measures implementing the 
EU circular economy plan and the METS  ‘ Lignes directrices nationales sur la 
s é quence  é viter, r é duire et compenser les impacts sur les milieux naturels ’ (here-
inafter  ‘ METS Lignes directrices ’ ). 
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 In 2014, the Commission adopted the  ‘ Communication setting out the action 
plan for a circular economy ’ , 74 but at present its effects remain unclear. The circu-
lar economy policy was positively received in France, with the Law concerning 
the energetic transition for the green growth enacted in 2015. 75 The legislation 
provides the ADEME with powers to adopt recommendations and guidelines 
on the disposal of waste as implementing acts of the circular economy plans. 
The ADEME has exercised this competence by adopting guidelines 76 to guide 
the public in the achievement of circular economy objectives. The language used 
in the ADEME documents is informative and educative. 77 To a large extent, 
ADEME soft law on circular economy reproduces the educative-informative 
content included in similar EU soft law measures. As an example, the ADEME 
has published a  fi che tecnique 78 on the EU system of ecolabelling. The document 
states that it seeks to diffuse information concerning the European Ecolabelling 
system in France, and contains links to the Commission website and the relevant 
guidance on the EU system on ecolabelling. 79 In addition, it sets out EU environ-
mental legislation and the interaction of the EU policies with relevant national 
measures. 
 The METS Lignes directices date back to 2013. 80 They are based on EU 
directives, 81 but reference and take note of Commission guidance. 82 They 
address  ‘ the concerned operators ’ such as state entities, companies and associa-
tions, and lay down principles and harmonised methods at the national level on 
the implementation of the  ‘ avoid, reduce and compensate ’ sequence 83 under EU 
and national legislation. 84 The guidelines specify that their nature is methodo-
logical and they  ‘ propose non-normative methods ’ . 85 
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In é dit au recueil Lebon. The judgment refers to the concept of  ‘ normative value ’ , which seems to 
correspond to the EU notion of  ‘ legally binding ’ effects. 
 Both the ADEME and METS soft law is primarily addressed to citizens and 
businesses. The ADEME guidelines in particular attempt to infl uence individ-
ual behaviour by addressing the general public. The ADEME and METS acts 
are also among the instruments guiding the activities of the French authori-
ties competent to enforce environmental law, that is, regional bodies and the 
so-called  pr é fets . 86 
 While it is not yet established whether this soft law could be applied as self-
standing instruments against individuals, one could argue that the ADEME and 
METS acts may be invoked together with liability rules applicable in the fi eld 
of environmental law concerning matters such as waste disposal. 87 In such a 
scenario, these soft law acts could be used as interpretative instruments to detail 
the content of obligations set out in EU and national legislation. If so, the need 
to obtain judicial protection in relation to these soft law acts is pronounced. 88 
Then again, the  ‘ self-binding ’ effect of French environmental soft law is limited. 
Due to their  ‘ educative ’ nature, these soft law measures could in principle bind 
their author only if the authority had sanctioning powers, which is not currently 
the case. For instance, the ADEME is not directly involved in the enforcement 
of environmental law, since its role is mainly advisory and educative. It cannot 
adopt decisions or issue measures that are binding on third parties based on its 
own soft law. Accordingly, the ADEME does not exercise any discretion in its 
relationship with individuals, and thus the question of whether its discretion 
is bound by its soft law becomes void. The same discussion also applies to the 
METS, which does not possess enforcement powers either. 
 To date, French courts have not exhaustively addressed the question of the 
legal effects of environmental soft law produced by the ADEME and the METS. 
In 2014, the Court of Appeal of Nancy held that the METS Lignes directices 
analysed above do not have  ‘ normative ’ value (ie, binding force). 89 The Court of 
Appeal did not consider the fact that these guidelines form part of the imple-
mentation measures of EU hard and soft law. Nor did it consider the presence of 
national hard law in interpreting the legal effects of the guidelines. However, this 
particular judgment was issued by a lower court, and a higher court might reach 
a different conclusion. A different interpretation of the legal effects of ADEME 
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acts is nevertheless likely in the light of the jurisprudential trends in France. In 
recent years, French courts have been increasingly open towards acknowledging 
the legal effects of soft law acts. 90 Be that as it may, in this case too, we observe 
the risk of fragmentation of legal effects of EU soft law and national imple-
menting measures, since the effects of national soft law are interpreted without 
taking those of the EU original measures into account. 
 B. National Soft Law Measures Implementing EU Environmental 
Soft Law in the UK 
 From an organisational perspective, UK environmental governance is more 
fragmented than the French system. The UK Environment Agency (UKEA) is 
the main body responsible for enforcing and issuing environmental permits. In 
addition, other authorities oversee the implementation of environmental poli-
cies in the different regions of the UK. 91 The UKEA has issued several soft law 
measures, which in most cases are adopted to implement EU soft or hard law. 
The following analysis focuses on two UKEA soft law acts: the  ‘ Guidance on the 
legal defi nition of waste and its application ’ and  ‘ European Union Emissions 
Trading System (EU ETS) Phase III  – Guidance for installations ’ , implement-
ing the Commission ’ s Guidance document on the Waste Framework Directive 
and the Commission ’ s Monitoring and Reporting Regulation (MRR) Guidance 
document, respectively. 
 The 2012  ‘ Guidance on the legal defi nition of waste and its application ’ 92 
is part of measures adopted by the UK to transpose 93 the Waste Framework 
Directive. 94 It also implements EU soft law instruments concerning the circu-
lar economy. It states the following:  ‘ This guidance is published alongside the 
Commission guidance interpreting the key provisions of the Directive  … and 
takes account of the Directive ’ s defi nitions and provisions. ’ 95 The fi nal part of 
the guidance seeks to make the principles established in the EU and national 
case law on the defi nition of waste more accessible to the public. The guidance 
specifi es that they do not change the legal defi nition of waste, and they do not 
take precedence over the case law on the defi nition ’ s interpretation. They only 
provide clarifi cations on that case law according to the competent authorities ’ 
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knowledge at the time of publication of the guidance. They also include details 
on how operators should use them. First, businesses and other organisations 
remain responsible for ensuring compliance with the law on waste, and the 
courts are in charge of interpreting it. Second, in the event of a disagreement 
between a competent authority and a third party as to whether a particular 
substance is waste, legal advice should be sought. 96 This guidance serves as an 
interpretative tool for waste operators that must comply with it. 97 It is not clear 
whether the guidance binds the discretion of the UKEA. 98 
 A second example of UK environmental soft law implementing EU soft law is 
the  ‘ European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) Phase III  – Guidance 
for installations ’ , which was adopted by the UKEA in 2018. 99 The original EU 
guidance clearly specifi es that it lacks legally binding effects. 100 The UKEA 
document serves various objectives. First, it describes the main provisions of the 
greenhouse emissions regulations. Second, it sets out the understanding of the 
views of the UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) 
on how the regulations should be applied and how particular provisions should 
be interpreted. Third, it sets out the regulators ’ understanding of BEIS ’ s views 
on how particular provisions in relevant European legislation should be read. 
The guidance also explains the conditions under which to obtain a permit under 
the UK regulations. In addition, it gives directions on how to make applica-
tions (including permit applications) and how to comply with the permit terms. 
It uses prescriptive language addressed to relevant operators on how to obtain 
the permits and the applicable requirements. 101 In particular, it clarifi es that the 
use of the word  ‘ must ’ indicate a legal requirement. 102 The guidance aims at 
complementing existing EU legislation, as it lists the obligations under the UK 
regulations and applicable European legislation. 
 Two features of the UKEA EU ETS soft law suggest that this document 
produces legal effects towards third parties: the prescriptive wording, aimed at 
infl uencing the behaviour of third parties, and the clear link 103 with national 
hard law and EU legislation. The presence of legal effects is confi rmed by the 
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fact that the UKEA has robust sanctioning powers and can punish violations of 
its soft law measures. However, if the UKEA EU ETS guidance is seen as enforce-
able, a twofold risk will arise. First, to the extent that the EU original measure 
has no binding effects, the legal effects of EU soft law and those of national 
implementing soft law will differ. Second, the enforceable nature of the UKEA 
EU ETS soft law may overachieve the objectives set in the original EU soft law. 
 Whether or not this guidance document binds the UKEA is uncertain. No 
guidance from the UK courts ’ case law exists concerning the legal effects of any 
UKEA soft law. 
 V. AN ANALYSIS 
 The picture that emerges from the analysis of implementation practices of EU 
soft law in France and the UK is complex. 
 In France, EU competition and environmental soft law has been imple-
mented through a combination of soft and hard law. In terms of legal effects, 
French authorities ’ soft law measures implementing EU soft law reproduce 
to a large extent the uncertainties surrounding the original EU soft law. A 
textual analysis of the implementing soft law reveals incoherencies in the 
practice of the French competition authority. The greatest problem is that 
the wording of soft law measures does not correspond to the way in which 
these acts are used in practice. For example, the AdC has included caveats 
excluding the  ‘ normative ’ purpose of its soft law documents, but has itself 
invoked them against individuals. Indeed, the AdC has relied on its  ‘ non-
binding ’ guidelines when issuing merger decisions. Similarly, French courts 
have interpreted the AdC ’ s soft law measures as binding on their author, but 
have not settled whether they may be invoked against third parties before 
national courts. 
 A degree of uncertainty arises in the environmental fi eld too. For example, 
the ADEME guidance documents implementing the Commission communica-
tions on the circular economy utilise a prescriptive language aimed at motivating 
citizens. Yet it is not clear whether they can be enforced against individuals. 
This option is not entirely ruled out, because the ADEME acts are capable of 
guiding the enforcement of environmental law by the French competent authori-
ties. The same observation with regard to individuals applies to METS soft law. 
Then again, self-binding effects for the issuing authority seem unlikely, because 
neither the ADEME nor the METS has enforcement powers of its own. With 
respect to case law, a French lower court has excluded the  ‘ normative nature ’ of 
national environmental soft law. 104 
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 Overall, French courts have not taken a clear stance on the effects of national 
soft law measures implementing EU soft law and have not interpreted the 
national acts in light of the original EU measures. 
 In the UK, the question of the binding nature of soft law has occupied 
neither regulators nor judges. In the area of competition law, UK legislation and 
soft law guidance include clauses requiring courts and sector operators to solve 
potential confl icts between EU acts (including soft law) and national implement-
ing measures in favour of the former (eg, section 60 of the Competition Act). 
Such clauses play a crucial role in ensuring coherence between the EU and the 
UK legal orders. The wording of the UK soft law does not rule out legal effects 
towards individuals. For this reason, there are no contradictions between the 
language used in those acts and the way in which these measures are applied or 
interpreted. The national legislative framework (eg, the competence of the CMA 
to issue soft law acts) and the enforcement powers of UK national authorities 
(eg, the UKEA sanctioning powers) suggest that UK soft law  – both competition 
and environmental  – is binding towards third parties. Whether or not UK soft 
law acts self-bind their authors is open to debate. However, such effects cannot 
be excluded in the absence of clear indications to the contrary. 
 Overall, UK courts have interpreted the effects of national soft law on a case-
by-case basis and have relied on soft law acts, mainly in the competition fi eld, 
as interpretative tools. No UK court has interpreted UKEA environmental soft 
law acts so far. 
 In a comparative analysis, the French implementing soft law is by and large 
faithful to the original EU soft law, and the terminology of the French soft law 
refl ects, to a large extent, that of the original EU measure and rules out the 
existence of legal effects. UK soft law seems instead to be written to have legally 
binding effects, unlike the original EU soft law that UK soft law implements. 
Consequently, UK soft law may run the risk of overachieving what EU soft law, 
deprived of legal effects, requires. Such a risk exists, for instance, in relation to 
the UKEA EU ETS Guidance, the wording of which is prescriptive and implies 
binding effects, while the EU original document is deprived of legally binding 
effects. 
 Yet, for both UK and French soft law implementing EU soft law, the same 
concern arises: these national acts may be  interpreted or applied as producing 
legal effects different from those of the EU original measure. 
 Even where EU soft law is considered as lacking legal effects, national imple-
menting measures can be interpreted and applied by courts and regulators in 
a binding manner. An example is provided by the AdC Lignes directrices, the 
wording of which creates signifi cant unpredictability for market operators. The 
document rules out its  ‘ normative purpose ’ . Yet the Lignes directrices have been 
relied on by AdC when the authority has evaluated alleged anti-competitive 
behaviour. Similarly, UK soft law acts implementing EU environmental soft law 
may be considered as having binding effects, while the original EU soft law is 
not binding. This fragmentation of legal effects of EU and national soft law 
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is problematic for two reasons. First, when the legal effects of national meas-
ures diverge from those intended by the original EU measure, national soft law 
implementing acts could interfere with the expected policy goals established at 
the EU level. Second, the fragmentation of legal effects across different policy 
levels adversely affects legal certainty, the principle of uniform application and 
legitimate expectations, as well as the sincere cooperation between EU and 
national authorities provided under Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU). 105 
 There are no easy fi xes. In order to  ‘ harmonise ’ the effects deriving from 
EU soft law measures across the Member States, one possible solution would 
be to apply national implementing (soft or hard) law consistently with EU soft 
law. But the principle of consistent interpretation can only partially address the 
fragmentation of the legal effects of EU soft law and national implementing 
measures. Namely, the unclear wording of EU soft law instruments and their 
inconsistent use by EU institutions may lead national authorities to implement 
EU soft law in a manner that does not correspond to the letter and spirit of 
the original soft law measure, but refl ects a national understanding of soft law. 
Consequently, divergent national implementing measures generate effects that 
are different from those envisaged by European institutions  – a situation that 
cannot be remedied by the principle of consistent interpretation. 106 
 The following question arises: how can we then ensure that the wording 
( scripta ) of soft law measures  ‘ stays ’ ( manent ) and does not  ‘ fl y away ’ ( volant ) ? 
Some suggestions are offered in the concluding remarks. 
 VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 This chapter has analysed the effects of selected EU soft law measures by 
authorities in France and the UK to implement EU competition and environ-
mental soft law. Implementation practices in France and the UK are different; 
furthermore, the effects of national soft law implementing EU soft law may 
diverge from those of the original EU soft law. The diversity of implementation 
practices and the (resulting) fragmentation of legal effects between EU soft law 
and national implementing measures are problematic for a number of reasons. 
They hinder legal certainty and the principle of legitimate expectations, as well 
as the sincere cooperation between EU and national authorities, guaranteed 
under Article 4(3) TEU. Ensuring a consistent interpretation of national imple-
menting measures in the light of EU soft law is not a perfect solution to the 
problem. When the wording of the original EU soft law measure is unclear or 
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its use by EU institutions is inconsistent, national authorities are often at a loss 
as to how to implement EU soft law. Consequently, the principle of consistent 
interpretation is not workable. 
 European and national authorities should instead strive to enhance the 
uniformity of the effects of soft law measures. But they should not embark on 
this effort in a non-coordinated fashion; rather, they should cooperate. Possible 
ways to do so include, among other things, institutional meetings involving EU 
and national authorities to determine the effects of EU soft law instruments 
and relevant implementing measures. A further option is the alignment of the 
wording of national soft law instruments with that used in the original EU soft 
law act, coupled with the duty of both EU and national authorities to apply soft 
law in line with the chosen wording. In particular, both EU and national entities 
should ensure that EU soft law is considered as  ‘ written words ’ ( scripta ), whose 
meaning and effects are to  ‘ remain ’ ( manent ) in the legal orders of the Member 
States. 
 
